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Abstract
This paper reviews the analysis of ﬁscal policy in the new open economy macro-
economics literature, in view of increasing interest in the question of transmission and
coordination of policies across countries, stirred by developments in this literature and
by the formation of the euro area. The analysis focuses on two main points: (i) the
identiﬁcation of welfare spillover eﬀects to third countries; and (ii) the assessments
made so far of the potential gains from pursuing non-cooperative and cooperative ﬁscal
stabilisation policies. Regarding welfare spillovers, some additional results are derived
to examine whether the exchange rate regime (ﬂexible or ﬁxed) matters for the size
of these spillovers, and whether the type of policy pursued (balanced-budget or debt-
ﬁnanced) matters. Fixed exchange rates only seem to postpone the costs from the short
to the long run, but the type of policy is crucial in determining the welfare impact of
ﬁscal expansions. With respect to policy coordination, attention is drawn to the need
to reﬂect on a potential role for ﬁscal policy as a stabilisation tool, and on possible
interactions between ﬁscal and monetary policy.
JEL classiﬁcation: F41, F42, E42
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The collapse of the Bretton Woods system of ﬁxed-exchange rates instigated the ﬁrst signif-
icant body of research on the international transmission of shocks and the need for policy
coordination. This ﬁrst generation research was based on the old Keynesian models that did
provide a theoretical rationale for policy coordination, but could not generate quantitatively
large coordination gains (see Canzoneri et al., 2002a, and references therein). Recently the
formation of the euro area and the emergence of the "new open economy macroeconomics"
(NOEM) literature has stirred interest again in the transatlantic transmission and coordi-
nation of monetary and ﬁscal policies. The NOEM literature is the ﬁrst inﬂuential attempt
to substitute the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbush (MFD) model as the workhorse framework for
analysing the international transmission by a micro-founded framework. Although building
on the MFD lineage, by considering nominal rigidities, the NOEM framework provides a
rationale for such rigidities by introducing monopolistic behaviour of economic agents, and
substitutes the ad-hoc evaluation of alternative policy regimes by rigorous welfare compar-
isons.
Since the publication of the seminal Redux model of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995), many
contributions have tried to understand more deeply the eﬀects of alternative monetary poli-
cies and their potential spillover eﬀects, by changing some key assumptions of the Redux.
However, little attention has been paid so far to the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy and ﬁscal pol-
icy coordinaton.1 The sign of the spillovers has been identiﬁed in some models, but the
estimation of the actual gains from ﬁscal coordination has not received the same rigorous
treatment that has been devoted to the study of the gains from monetary policy coordi-
nation. Meyer et al. (2002), list several reasons that could explain why ﬁscal policy has
been mostly overlooked in this area. The ﬁrst reason they put forward is the fact that,
1A survey of NOEM models, focusing on monetary policy transmisson can be found in Lane (2001).
Ganelli and Lane (2002) survey also contributions that address ﬁscal policy issues. This paper refers to
some of the research on ﬁscal policy surveyed by these authors and reviews additional one.
1during the 1970’s, the criticism of stabilisation policies in general fell most heavily on ﬁscal
policy simply because ﬁscal stabilisation had played a major role during the 50’s and 60’s.
In addition several speciﬁc drawbacks have been attributed to the use of ﬁscal policy as a
stabilisation tool. The most frequently cited are: its inﬂexibility to be changed in a timely
fashion, the potentially small eﬀects of temporary measures, such as temporary tax changes,
and the fact that ﬁscal policy is often used for political goals.
Referring speciﬁcally to policy coordination between the euro area and the United States,
Canzoneri et al. (2002b) emphasise that for reasons similar to those listed above "both the
theoretical case and the political momentum for transatlantic policy coordination seem to
be lacking at present...".2 Nevertheless their empirical estimates (albeit imprecise) suggest
that there may be sizeable eﬀects of US ﬁscal shocks on EU consumption and output. They
suggest treating ﬁscal expansions/contractions as exogenous shocks to which the monetary
authority has to react. Evaluating the need for policy coordination would then boil down to
assessing whether these additional shocks make it more or less desirable for the monetary
authorities to coordinate across the Atlantic.
On the other hand, some of the drawbacks of direct ﬁscal policy coordination could
be overcome. To tackle the problem of timeliness, Meyer et al. (2002) suggest that more
emphasis be given to the design of "automatic stabilisers". They also highlight other ar-
guments in support of ﬁscal policy stabilisation. Even if ﬁscal policy changes take longer
to be put in place, they aﬀect the economy faster than monetary policy. In addition, in
some cases ﬁscal stabilisation may be the only viable alternative. In the case of Japan, for
instance, where economic activity has been weak and short-term interest rates have reached
a zero lower bound, ﬁscal policy seems the only way to stimulate economic activity. Ad-
ditionally, in EMU where monetary policy has been delegated to a common independent
institution, ﬁscal policy emerges as the only ﬂexible tool available to individual economies
2To this has also contributed the fact that the external representation of the euro area in international fora
has remained so decentralised. Although the new draft Constitution for the European Union constitutes
ab a s ef o re n s u r i n gac o m m o nv o i c e ,i tr e m a i n su n d e ﬁned who will represent that voice (see European
Convention, 2003).
2for stabilising country-speciﬁc or asymmetric shocks. Whether there is a need for ﬁscal co-
ordination among EMU member countries remains therefore a fundamental question. Even
if the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which binds governments in EMU to maintain
their budget deﬁcits below 3%, remains in place to address the problem of the expansionary
bias in ﬁscal policy (see Canzoneri et al. 2002b, for a discussion of the presence of a ﬁscal
spending bias in NOEM), automatic stabilisers and discretionary policy within the limits
of the SGP could be designed more optimally.
In theory, as well as in practice, the key requirement for policy coordination to be desir-
able is the presence of externalities. Even though the NOEM literature has paid relatively
little attention to ﬁscal policy, some results can already be inferred regarding the potential
signs and magnitudes of ﬁscal spillovers. This paper reviews the analysis of ﬁscal policy
in recent new open economy macroeconomic models, focusing on two main points. The
ﬁrst is the identiﬁcation of potential spillover eﬀects to third countries resulting from dis-
cretionary ﬁscal policy in one country in a non-stochastic context. Some additional results
are derived to test whether the exchange rate regime (ﬂexible or ﬁxed) matters for the size
of the spillovers (relevant for EMU) and whether the type of policy (balanced-budget or
debt-ﬁnanced) matters (relevant for the Stability and Growth Pact and for the current debt-
ﬁnanced tax cuts in the US).3 The choice of a ﬁxed exchange rate over a ﬂexible regime only
seems to postpone the costs from the short to the long run, but the type of policy ﬁnancing
is crucial to determine if the external impact of a ﬁscal expansion by one country is positive
or negative. The second part of the analysis reviews the assessments made so far of the
potential gains from pursuing non-cooperative and cooperative ﬁscal stabilisation policies,
in a stochastic environment. Even when large spillover eﬀects are identiﬁed, coordination
would only be useful if it can improve signiﬁcantly upon nationally oriented policies There
are still very few contributions addressing this question but, among these, Kim and Kim
3Here we compare a ﬂexible exchange rate regime with a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. This would address
the question of whether coordination among EU countries could be more important than coordination among
two countries with an independent ﬂoating regime, e.g. the US and the UK. Caselli (2001) instead compares
an asymmetric peg (such as the hard Exchange Rate Mechanism) with a symmetric peg (such as monetary
union).
3(2003) already give evidence that the gains can be potentially large. As a ﬁnal note, how-
ever, attention is drawn to the need to reﬂect on some fundamental questions that have
emerged as research in this area progresses, mainly about how to model ﬁscal policy and
how to think about the interactions between ﬁscal and monetary policy.
2 The New Framework of Open Economy Macroeconomics
The ﬁrst main diﬀerence between the new models and the old Mundell-Fleming-Dornbush
(MFD) analysis is their micro-founded nature. The demand for products and the supply
of labour result from the maximization of consumers’ preferences, while output supply and
prices result from the maximisation of ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Short-run price rigidities are the main
feature inherited from the MFD, but the output dynamics generated by this assumption are
better justiﬁed by the presence of monopolistic producers and proﬁt margins, which ensure
that in the short-run output is determined by demand.
In addition money demand is also introduced with a microeconomic foundation, usually
by introducing money in the utility function.4 The money demand equations that result
from utility maximisation are substantially diﬀerent from the money demand equation typ-
ically assumed in the MFD framework. In NOEM models that introduce money in the
utility function, money demand is a function of disposable income, while in MFD models it
appears as a function of gross income. This diﬀerence can generate diﬀerent dynamics for
output and the exchange rate.
To give an idea of the dynamics that can be generated in NOEM models, this section
will present their key ingredients, outlining in more detail the particular assumptions of
the Redux model. Diﬀerent assumptions have been studied in the literature but mostly to
analyse their impact on the transmission of money supply shocks.5 Hence it is useful to
return to the Redux starting point to address ﬁscal interactions.
4Alternatively money could be introduced using Cash-in-Advance constraints. See Coutinho (2002) for
an example of a NOEM model with such constraints.
5For more exhaustive surveys of the NOEM literature see Lane (2001) and Ganelli and Lane (2002).
42.1 Preferences
In NOEM, the allocation of resources between consumption, work eﬀort and assets is based
on the maximisation of the utility of households. The functional form that has been typically
adopted for the consumers’ utility takes the form:
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where C is a consumption bundle, M/P are real money holdings and Y is output (linked
to work eﬀort through a production function). The form of the functions U,H,V is an
important choice, since results have been shown to diﬀer, sometimes crucially, according to
the speciﬁcations chosen. The most often used are constant elasticity functions:
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In the Redux model of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ ρ = ε =1 ,a n dU, and H reduce to logarithmic
functions. With these assumptions optimal money holdings are proportional to the nominal
consumption. The disutility from work eﬀort in the Redux takes the quadratic form with
ν =2 . It assumes a disutility of labour of the form −φL,w h e r eL is labour and φ a
positive parameter, and a production function of the form Y = ALα,w h e r eα =1 /2 and
K =2 φ/A1/α.T h e v a r i a b l e A is labour productivity (a rise in A is captured by a fall in
K).
In the Redux model consumption preferences are over a basket of product varieties C(z)
produced in the home and foreign country:
Cj =
·Z 1
0
C(z)
σ−1
σ dz
¸ σ
σ−1
(1)
where σ>1. In this case the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods
and the index of monopolistic distortion are implicitly the same. Corsetti and Pesenti
5(2001) separate the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign products using a
Cobb-Douglas function to aggregate home goods and foreign goods into a total consumption
basket. This implies a unitary elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods,
while the elasticity of substitution between varieties of each good remains equal to σ.I n
Corsetti and Pesenti’s speciﬁcation the unitary elasticity of intratemporal substitution is
equal to the elasticity of relative net output demand with respect to relative prices. There-
fore, when the relative price of the home good decreases, demand for that good increases
relatively to the foreign good. Home income increases relative to foreign income but home
purchasing power declines proportionally; therefore there is no incentive for international
lending or borrowing: terms-of-trade movements provide complete risk sharing. In the Re-
dux model however, the elasticity of substitution is bigger than one, hence home income
increases relative to foreign income by more than the decline in the terms of trade and
home residents are willing to lend resources abroad for consumption smoothing purposes.
Although Corsetti and Pesenti’s formulation shuts down the current account channel, it
allows us to obtain analytical solutions without recourse to loglinearisations even without
imposing symmetry across countries, so that the impact of structural diﬀerences across
countries can be easily analysed. However, Tille (2001) shows that the assumption of a
unitary elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods may be too restrictive.
He uses a model where the overall consumption basket is a CES aggregate of the home and
foreign goods baskets, CH and CF respectively:
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where n i st h er e l a t i v es i z eo fc o u n t r yH. CH is a composite of goods produced at Home,
aggregated with a constant elasticity σ, which also measures the degree of monopolistic
competition within the country; and CF is a similar composite of goods produced in the
foreign country. This speciﬁcation encompasses the Redux when θ = σ, and Corsetti and
Pesenti (2001) when θ =1<σ .T h e l a r g e r θ, the larger the degree of substitutability
between home and foreign goods, and the stronger the expenditure-switching eﬀect caused
by shocks to the economy.
62.2 Price Setting and Nominal Rigidities
In the Redux model, prices are ﬁxed simultaneously by all producers for one period. This
implies that one period after the shocks the economy is again at steady-state. The assump-
tion of simultaneous pricing decisions for all ﬁrms has been relaxed in subsequent models
with Calvo or Taylor-type contracts. This allows us to generate persistency in the eﬀects of
shocks.6 The nominal rigidities can also take the form of pre-set wages, instead of pre-set
prices. When ﬁrms face a constant elasticity of demand and therefore set prices as a con-
stant mark-up over marginal costs, the wage stickiness fully translates into price-stickiness,
hence pre-setting wages or prices result in the same transmission of shocks.
It is also assumed that there are no impediments to trade, so that the law of one price
holds. Therefore, home’s consumer price index corresponding to the consumption bundle
(1) is given by:
P =
·Z n
0
P(h)1−σdh +
Z 1
n
EP∗(f)1−σdf
¸ 1
1−σ
where E is the nominal exchange rate (domestic currency per unit of foreign currency).
Since the foreign consumption bundle has the same composition as the domestic, it follows
that purchasing power parity holds in this model, while the terms-of-trade P(h)/EP∗(f),
deﬁned as the ratio of the price of exports (price of goods produced domestically) to the
price of imports (price of goods produced abroad), moves in response to shocks in the global
economy.7
Another important assumption of the Redux regarding pricing and international trade
is the assumption that prices are ﬁxed in the exporters’ currency. This has implications
for how the terms-of-trade move in reaction to nominal exchange rate shocks. Under this
assumption, the domestic terms-of-trade increase (improve), according to our deﬁnition,
6See Lane (2001) for a detailed discussion on this point.
7We maintain this deﬁnition throughout the paper. An increase in P(h)/EP
∗(f) will be referred to as an
improvement in the home country’s terms of trade, since it implies that the home country receives relatively
more for its exports while paying relatively less for its imports. The opposit is felt by foreign country,
therefore an increase in P(h)/EP
∗(f) corresponds to a worsening in the foreign country’s terms of trade.
7when the domestic currency appreciates (when E falls), while the opposite would occur if
prices where rigid in the currency of the importer (local currency pricing). Many contribu-
tions have analysed the implications of considering local currency pricing or of intermediate
degrees of pass-through (see Lane, 2001, for a survey), which boil down to eliminating or
reducing the expenditure-switching eﬀect of a nominal exchange rate change, through which
a depreciation of the domestic currency will cause the relative price of domestic exports to
fall and redirect world demand towards domestic products.
2.3 Budget Constraints
The literature has considered both asset market completeness and incompleteness. With
asset market completeness and the law of one price, there is complete risk sharing between
countries and no shifts in wealth arising from exogenous shocks. This assumption eliminates
the current account as a channel of transmission. It is important to note that the nature
of asset markets is irrelevant in the set up of Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), since the unitary
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods already ensures complete risk
sharing. In the Redux model, in which elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
goods is larger than one, ﬁnancial markets are assumed to be incomplete with only one
riskless bond being traded internationally, such that the individual j’s budget constraint
takes the form:
PtB
j
t+1 + M
j
t = Pt(1 + rt)B
j
t + M
j
t−1 + Pt(j)Yt(j) − PtC
j
t − PtTt
where M is money holdings, B a one-period riskless bond and T are net taxes.
As a mirror image of the consumer’s budget constraint, the consolidated budget con-
straint of the ﬁscal and monetary authorities typically takes the form:
0=Tt +
Mt − Mt−1
Pt
This constraint assumes no government spending. In section 3 the model will be extended
to include ﬁscal policy.
82.4 Demand Curves, First Order Conditions and the Current Account
Under the assumptions of the Redux, expenditure minimisation ensures that the demand
of individual j for product z will take the form:
C
j
t(z)=
µ
Pt(z)
Pt
¶−σ
C
j
t
With no home bias in private consumption the total demand faced by the producer of good
z is given by:
Y d
t (z)=
µ
Pt(z)
Pt
¶−σ
Cw
t
Given the demand curve faced by each producer, the maximisation of the representative
consumer’s utility subject to the budget constraint will deﬁne three main optimal relation-
ships: the Euler equation, the money demand equation and the labour-leisure trade-oﬀ.
Considering no heterogeneity between consumers within one country (therefore eliminating
the superscripts j) these conditions in the Redux are the following for the home country:
Ct+1 = β(1 + rt+1)Ct
Mt
Pt
= χCt
µ
1+it+1
it+1
¶
Y
σ+1
σ
t =
σ − 1
σk
(Cw
t )
1
σ 1
Ct
The conditions for the foreign country are parallel to this, with foreign variables indexed
by an asterisk. Consolidating the consumer’s budget constraint with that of the authorities
gives the current account relationship. In the Redux, the current account relationship
for the home country takes the following form (a parallel condition holds for the foreign
country):
Bt+1 − Bt = rtBt +
Pt(h)Yt
Pt
− Ct
2.5 Symmetric Steady State and Log-linearised Equations
The Redux although relatively simple, does not have a closed-form solution. An approxi-
mate solution can be found by log-linearising the equilibrium conditions around the steady
9state. The initial symmetric steady state in the Redux is characterised by the following
conditions:
r=δ =
1 − β
β
;
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P
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P
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0
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0 = C
w
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The model can then be linearised around this steady state.
2.6 The Short-run Equilibrium
Since prices take only one period to adjust, the model is reduced to two periods: the short
run, when prices remain ﬁxed, and the long run, after adjustments take place. For this
reason it is possible to drop the time subscripts and distinguish long-run variables with
an upper bar. The labour-leisure trade-oﬀ is not binding in the short run and output is
demand determined.8 Using the optimality condition for the money market it is possible to
deﬁne an equilibrium locus between the exchange rate and relative consumption, which is
downward sloping. An upward-sloping schedule between these two variables is found using
optimality conditions other than the money market (and the labour-leisure trade-oﬀ).
With symmetric parameters, it is useful to resort to the Aoki method: diﬀerences be-
tween the equilibrium equations allow us to obtain the impact on relative variables (e.g.
home output minus foreign output), while the sum of equilibrium equations allows us to
obtain the results for the world aggregates xw = nx +( 1− n)x∗,w h e r en is the relative
size of the home country and x is any variable of interest (expressed in percentage devi-
ation from its steady state value). The overall eﬀects on x and x∗ can then be obtained
by combining the relative and aggregate eﬀects, such that x = xw +( 1− n)(x − x∗),a n d
x∗ = xw + −n(x − x∗).
8Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) note that the shock cannot be as large as to drive marginal costs above
prices. In this case the monopolist would not keep prices constant. Hence the analysis applies only to a
speciﬁc range of shocks.
102.7 The Long-run Equilibrium
In the long run, the labour-leisure trade-oﬀ is binding. It deﬁnes an equilibrium schedule
between long-run relative consumption and net foreign assets. The long and short-run
current account conditions pin down net foreign assets in terms of shocks.
2.8 Welfare Analysis
The welfare eﬀect of marginal shocks can be assessed by log-linearising the utility function.
In the case of the Redux this yields:
dUR = c −
¡
ky2
0
¢
y +
1
δ
¡
c −
¡
ky2
0
¢
y
¢
where UR is the consumer’s utility excluding the utility from holding money balances. This
log-linearisation cannot be used to assess the impact of large shocks. One of the advantages
of the model by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) over the Redux is the fact that it has closed
form solutions, allowing us to study the welfare eﬀects without resorting to log-linearisation,
which enables one to consider large shocks.9
3F i s c a l P o l i c y i n t h e N O E M f r a m e w o r k
3.1 Redux
In Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ’s (1996) extension of the Redux model, government spending is
introduced as a basket of public consumption goods aggregated in the same way as for
private consumption, such that there is no home bias in government spending:
G =
·Z 1
0
g(z)
σ
σ−1dz
¸
,G ∗ =
·Z 1
0
g∗(z)
σ
σ−1dz
¸
The demand schedule for each public consumption good is given by:
G(z)=
·
P(z)
P
¸−σ
G
9Within the limits of the ﬁrms’ and/or workers’ participation constraints (see Corsetti and Pesenti, 2001).
11Government spending enters as an exogenous shock to the demand schedule of every pro-
ducer:
Y d(z)=
·
P(z)
P
¸−σ
(Cw + Gw)
The consolidated budget constraint of the ﬁscal and monetary authorities is also extended
to consider government consumption:
G = T +
M − M0
P
The other building blocks of the model and steady state conditions remain the same as in
the previous section. Log-linearising the model around a symmetric steady state, assuming
that initial asset holdings are equal to zero, yields the following system of linear equations:
yt = σ [pt − pt (h)] + cw
t + gw
t market clearing
y∗
t = σ [p∗
t − p∗
t (f)] + cw
t + gw
t
mt − pt = ct −
r
1+δ
−
pt − pt
δ
money demand
m∗
t − p∗
t = c∗
t −
r
1+δ
−
p∗
t − p∗
t
δ
(1 + σ)yt = −σct + cw
t + gw
t labour-leisure trade-off
(1 + σ)y∗
t = −σc∗
t + cw
t + gw
t
b = y − c − g − (1 − n)e SR current account
b
∗
= y∗ − c∗ − g∗ + ne
c = δb + p(h)+y − p − g LR current account
c∗ = δb
∗
+ p∗(f)+y∗ − p∗ − g∗
where lower case letters denote percentage deviations of upper case variables from their
initial steady state values.10
With no home bias in government consumption, a balanced-budget increase in govern-
ment spending increases demand for both domestic and foreign goods while the tax bill
10The algebra needed to derive these equations is described in detail in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996).
12falls on domestic residents. A rise in home government spending increases world output.
At home, however, the rise in output is not enough to oﬀs e tt h er i s ei nt a x e sa th o m e ;
therefore home consumption falls. Lower consumption implies lower money demand requir-
ing a depreciation of the currency when prices are ﬁxed. This raises demand for domestic
goods and lowers demand for foreign goods, further rising output in the home country and
dampening it abroad. When the domestic ﬁscal expansion is temporary, the net eﬀect on
foreign output in the short run is positive, because the direct eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nw o r l d
demand is stronger than the negative eﬀect caused by the depreciation of the home cur-
rency. However, when the domestic ﬁscal expansion is permanent, the negative eﬀect of the
depreciation dominates and the overall impact on foreign output is negative in the short
run. This spillover eﬀect is at odds with the predictions from MFD models. In the MFD
models a ﬁscal expansion by one country leads to an appreciation of its currency and an
increase for the demand of foreign products.
If the domestic ﬁscal expansion is temporary, the home country runs a deﬁcit as in the
standard ﬂexible price intertemporal model. There is a fall in the long-run relative price of
home goods and long-run relative output increases, while relative consumption goes down
with the decrease in net foreign assets. In this case, the expansion reduces foreign output
in the long run because in the long run there is no exogenous expansion of world demand
(since the shock is temporary), but only a negative impact caused by the re-direction of
world demand towards home goods (which became cheaper). Table 1 summarises the eﬀects
of a temporary ﬁscal expansion (see Appendix A.1 for details on these and other results
presented in this section, most of which are also outlined in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 1996).
On the other hand, when the domestic expansion is permanent, the home country runs
a surplus. With a permanent shock, the short-run nominal exchange rate depreciates by
more and the positive impact of the depreciation on net foreign assets due to an increase in
disposable income becomes larger than the negative impact of the increase in public con-
sumption.11 In the long run there is still a decline in the relative price of home goods because
11Ganelli and Lane (2002) point out that this holds when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of
13Table 1: Eﬀects of a temporary balanced-budget increase in government spending in the
Redux model
∂c
∂g
= −
(1 − n)δ (1 + σ)
σδ(1 + σ)+2 σ
< 0
∂c
∂g∗ =
(1 − n)δ (1 + σ)
σδ(1 + σ)+2 σ
> 0
∂c
∂g
= −
(1 − n)δ (1 + σ)
σδ(1 + σ)+2 σ
< 0
∂c
∂g∗ =
(1 − n)δ (1 + σ)
σδ(1 + σ)+2 σ
> 0
∂y
∂g
= n +
δ (1 + σ)(1− n)
δ (1 + σ)+2
> 0
∂y
∂g∗ =1− n −
δ(1 + σ)(1− n)
δ (1 + σ)+2
> 0
∂y
∂g
=
δ(1 − n)
δ (1 + σ)+2
> 0
∂y
∂g∗ = −
δ(1 − n)
δ (1 + σ)+2
< 0
the upward pressure on relative prices due to the increase in net foreign assets is more than
oﬀset by the downward pressure caused by the increase in long-run public consumption.
The permanent ﬁscal expansion decreases long-run domestic private consumption at home
and increases it abroad. Long-run income increases both at home and abroad. In this case
the long-run spillover eﬀect on foreign output is positive because there is a positive direct
eﬀect caused by the increase in world demand due to the ﬁscal expansion that oﬀsets the
negative impact caused by the decline in the relative price of home goods (which shifts
demand away from foreign goods).12
Considering marginal changes in government spending, it is possible to evaluate the
overall impact using the log-linearisation of consumer’s utility function:
dUR = −
σ − n
2σ
·
2g +
(2σ − n)
(σ − n)δ
g
¸
+
(1 − n)
2σ
·
2g∗ +
1
δ
g∗
¸
Overall, a domestic balanced-budget ﬁscal expansion (temporary or permanent) decreases
welfare at home and increases it abroad. The reverse is true for a balanced-budget tax cut
(ﬁscal contraction).
real money balances is smaller than 1+θ, which is the case with the Redux logarithmic preferences for real
balances. With ﬁxed prices, an unanticipated permanent increase in government spending tilts the time
proﬁle of output, since output rises more in the short-run than in the long-run on account of the temporary
nominal rigidity, leading to a fall in the short-run real interest rate.
12The eﬀects of a permanent ﬁscal expansion are shown in the Appendix A.1, and correspond to the results
found in Ganelli (2003) for the case where ﬁscal spending does not enter the utility function (the case of
γ =0in his model).
14The beggar-thyself nature of a ﬁscal expansion in the Redux can be moderated by having
government spending entering directly in the utility function. Ganelli(2003a) shows that
with utility-enhancing government spending a domestic ﬁscal expansion can have a positive
eﬀect on welfare if the direct eﬀect in utility more than oﬀsets the negative welfare eﬀects
due to the crowding out of private consumption.
3 . 2 F i x e d - E x c h a n g eR a t eR e d u x
Maintaining the assumption of no-home bias in government consumption, a balanced-budget
increase in government spending increases demand for both domestic and foreign goods. In
the short run home and foreign output increase by the same amount through this eﬀect. At
home, the rise in output still cannot oﬀset the rise in taxes; and therefore home consumption
falls. Lower consumption implies lower money demand requiring a depreciation of the
currency when prices are ﬁxed. This time the exchange rate cannot change, hence money
supply has to accommodate the change in relative consumption. With no change in the
nominal exchange rate, there are no further eﬀects on output: relative output does not
change.
Under a ﬁxed exchange rate, independently of whether the ﬁscal expansion is permanent
or temporary, the overall eﬀect on total relative consumption (private plus public) is positive.
Since relative output does not change, net foreign assets decrease in the home country. Long-
run relative consumption decreases and the long-run relative price of home goods declines.
T h ef a l li nt h er e l a t i v ep r i c eo fh o m eg o o d sl e a d st oa ni n c r e a s ei nr e l a t i v eo u t p u ti nt h el o n g
run. This relative price change is stronger than in the case of a ﬂexible exchange rate regime.
Table 2 summarises these results. Interestingly, the overall eﬀect of a ﬁscal expansion on
welfare is the same under a ﬂexible or a ﬁxed exchange rate regime (see Appendix A.2 for
details). The lower decrease in leisure in the short run under the ﬁxed regime exactly oﬀsets
the larger negative impact on short and long-r u nc o n s u m p t i o na n do nl o n g - r u nl e i s u r e .
It is important to note that the assumptions regarding monetary policy are important
to determine the results, since monetary policy will determine the response of short-run
15Table 2: Eﬀects of a balanced-budget increase in government spending in a ﬁxed-exchange
rate Redux model
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aggregate consumption. Here we assume that in the two regimes the world money sup-
ply remains ﬁxed. Caselli (2001) instead compares an asymmetric peg (such as the hard
Exchange Rate Mechanism), where the world money supply has to change in response to
shocks because only one country adjusts to keep the exchange rate ﬁxed, with an symmetric
peg (such as monetary union), where the world money supply is kept constant.
3.3 Perfect Risk Sharing
Betts and Devereux (1999) extended the Redux model to include complete asset markets,
while keeping the assumption of no home bias in government spending, and found that in
this case the costs of a ﬁscal expansion were shared equally by the two countries. As men-
tioned earlier, Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) develop a model where the degree of monopolistic
competition and the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods are not equal
as in the Redux. In their model the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
goods in the consumption bundle is one (due to the Cobb-Douglas aggregation), while the
elasticity of substitution between varieties is bigger than one. In this formulation, the terms
of trade provide the same kind of risk sharing as with complete markets. However, their
results are not directly comparable to those of Betts and Devereux (1999) because they as-
sume home bias in government spending. The implications of this assumption are discussed
in the next section.
163.4 Home Bias and Consumption Substitutability
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) consider the other extreme case of complete home bias in
government spending. In the short run, a domestic ﬁscal expansion raises domestic output
one to one. Due to the Cobb-Douglas aggregation there are no eﬀects on other variables. All
the costs of a temporary ﬁscal expansion are borne by the expanding country. If the ﬁscal
expansion is permanent, the increase in the demand for home goods caused by the increase in
public consumption requires an upward adjustment in the relative price of home goods in the
long run, leading to an improvement in home’s terms-of-trade, deﬁned here as the ratio of the
price of goods produced at home to the price of goods produced abroad (the opposite occurs
in the Redux where public spending falls equally on home and foreign goods). The long-
run eﬀects will ultimately depend on the degree of consumption substitutability between
home and foreign goods. In Corsetti and Pesenti’s (2001) model the degree of consumption
substitutability between home and foreign goods is determined by the coeﬃcient of risk
aversion ρ, given that the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods in
the consumption bundle is set to one by the Cobb-Douglas aggregation. If home and
foreign goods are substitutes (ρ>1), the eﬀect of a domestic ﬁscal expansion on welfare
abroad is always negative: a ﬁscal expansion increases the relative price of home goods
reducing demand for the home good, if the goods are substitutes demand for the foreign
good increases and so does labour supply, while foreign consumption decreases due to the
negative impact on wealth due to the deterioration of the foreign country’s terms of trade.
If home and foreign goods are complements (ρ<1), labour supply abroad decreases and
the ﬁnal eﬀect depends on the relative weight of consumption and leisure in the utility, but
Corsetti and Pesenti argue that the eﬀect is negative for a wide range of parameter values.
Tille (2001) adopts a more general speciﬁcation where the within-country elasticity
of substitution σ, the cross-country elasticity of substitution θ and the coeﬃcient of risk
aversion ρ are allowed to vary independently (the indexes assumed for the aggregation of
goods were described in section 2.1.13 This speciﬁcation encompasses the Redux when
ρ =1<σ= θ, and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), when θ =1<σ . As in Corsetti and
13The elasticity σ has to be between 1 and +∞ to ensure stability, but θ c a nb eb i g g e ro rs m a l l e rt h a n
17Pesenti (2001), the results diﬀer from the Redux, not only because complete home bias in
government expenditure is assumed, but also, and more importantly, because cross-country
substitutability is going to determine the strength of the expenditure-switching eﬀect of
shocks. Assuming that ρ =1for simplicity, when θ>1, goods produced in diﬀerent
countries are close substitutes, and the Marshal-Lerner-Robinson (MLR) is satisﬁed. In this
case, a ﬁscal expansion causes the net present value of revenues to fall (because substitution
towards foreign goods caused by an increase in the relative price of home goods in the
long run oﬀsets the long-run improvement in home’s terms-of-trade), while the opposite
is true when θ<1.14 If government spending enters the utility of consumers, then home
consumers will be better oﬀ in welfare terms following a domestic ﬁscal expansion, but this
eﬀect will be lower the higher the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods.
For this reason, when direct utility from government expenditure is omitted, the welfare
impact of a domestic ﬁscal expansion can be negative when the substitutability between
home and foreign goods is high (beggar-thyself eﬀect). Tille ﬁnds that the foreign country
is always negatively aﬀected by a domestic ﬁscal expansion, regardless of the assumptions
concerning the utility of government spending. This beggar-thy-neighbour eﬀect is stronger
the lower the degree of cross-country substitutability, because with low substitutability, the
deterioration of the foreign country’s terms-of-trade is not compensated by a signiﬁcant
s h i f ti nd e m a n dt o w a r d sf o r e i g ng o o d s .
3.5 Government Debt
In the previous models Ricardian equivalence holds, therefore there is no role for government
debt. In these models only balanced-budget ﬁscal policies can be analysed. One way
one. It is also assumed that θρ > ρ − 1. The letters for the parameters follow the notation adopted in this
paper, which is diﬀerent from the one adopted in Tille (2001), where 1/σ is our ρ, ρ is our θ,a n dθ is our σ.
14In the case of high substitutability between home and foreign goods (θ<1) there is a depreciation of
the home currency in the short-run (like in the Redux) but the terms of trade improve in the long-run. In
the case of low substitutability (θ<1) the terms of trade improve both in the long and in the short-run.
In both cases the long-run eﬀect dominates. In Corsetti and Pesenti’s (2001) case of θ =1 , the short-term
impact on the terms of trade is zero.
18to break down the Ricardian equivalence is to consider overlapping generations. Ganelli
(2003b) uses an overlapping generations model to evaluate the eﬀects of a debt-ﬁnanced
temporary reduction in taxes (long-run taxes increase endogenously in subsequent periods
to meet the interest payments). He also outlines the eﬀects of an increase in government
expenditure ﬁnanced by a tax increase (balanced budget) or by an increase in debt.
In Ganelli’s Blanchard-type overlapping generations framework agents have a positive
probability (1−q) of dying and hence of not having to repay debt in the future. Therefore
ad e b t - ﬁnanced tax cut represents an increase in their net wealth. While a balanced-budget
ﬁscal expansion by the home country in this model also produces a depreciation of the home
currency (as in the Redux model), a debt-ﬁnanced tax cut produces an appreciation of the
domestic currency in the short run. This occurs because the increase in the net wealth of
home consumers leads them to increase short-run consumption (the beneﬁts for home agents
are strong enough to compensate for the fact that there is a positive probability that they
may be alive to repay the debt next period). Since the increase in consumption falls both on
home and foreign products, proﬁt shares increase at home and abroad leading to a further
increase in consumption both at home and abroad. The increase of home consumption is
greater than the increase in foreign consumption, hence domestic money demand increases
relative to foreign demand, leading to the appreciation of the home currency. Analytically,
the short-run eﬀects of debt-ﬁnanced tax cuts on consumption and on the exchange rate
c a nb es u m m a r i s e da sf o l l o w s : 15
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where a1,a 2,a 3,a 4 and a5 are positive coeﬃcients, ψ is the weight of the disutility of labour
in the utility function, q is the probability of surviving, R0 is the steady-state gross real rate
15The results for short-run relative consumption and output can be found in Ganelli (2003b). The results
for the log-linear world aggregates are derived in the Appendix.
19of interest and d i st h ei n c r e a s ei nd e b tr e q u i r e dt oﬁnance the tax cut.16 Since short-run
world consumption and relative consumption both increase following a debt-ﬁnanced tax
cut by the home country, the overall impact of this policy on short-run home consumption
is positive. The eﬀect on short-run foreign consumption, however, depends on whether the
increase in world demand is enough to compensate for the decline in the foreign country’s
terms-of-trade. Carrying out simulations for a range of reasonable parameter values suggests
that the eﬀect is likely to be positive (the simulations and baseline parameters are explained
in Appendix A.3).
The short-run appreciation of the home currency leads to a decline in relative output (in
the short run output is determined by demand and is not inﬂuenced by supply-side labour-
leisure trade-oﬀ decisions). However, since world output increases due to the increase in
consumption both at home and abroad, the overall eﬀect on domestic output is ambiguous,
b u tt h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect caused by expenditure-switching is smaller the larger the size of
the country. Overall, the simulations show that the eﬀect is most probably positive. The
output spillover eﬀect on the foreign country is always positive regardless of the size of the
country. Analytically, these are the short-run eﬀects on output:
(y − y∗)=σe = e = −
a4a1ψσ(R0 − 1)
a2 (1 + ψ)(σ − 1+ψ)R0
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The simulations (see Appendix for details) also show that the short-run impact on welfare
is likely to be positive for the home country and negative abroad. The eﬀects decline as the
probability of staying alive next period, q, increases. The spillover welfare eﬀects on the
foreign country only appear to be positive when the home country is small (less than 0.3 of
the world market for the baseline simulation values) or when the elasticity of substitution
16The expressions for the coeﬃcients ai in terms of the structural parameters are:
a1 =
1−qβ
1+χ+ψ(1 − q)(1 + ψ)
R0
R0−q
a2 =1− a1
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(σ−1+ψ)(1+ψ)
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σ−1+σψ
σ−1+ψ
a4 =
a2R0(R0−1)(σ−1)
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20between varieties is low (for this result, the elasticity of substitution should be less than
4.5, while the literature, e.g. Rottemberg and Woodford (1998), usually calibrates this
parameter above 7). Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the sensitivity of the simulations to these
parameters.
To assess the long-run impact of the tax cut ﬁnanced by debt, it is suﬃcient to observe
that net foreign assets decrease and the country runs a deﬁcit. Long-run relative consump-
tion decreases and the long-run relative price of home goods falls, leading also to an increase
in relative output. Hence, in the long run this policy has detrimental eﬀects for the welfare
in the home country and positive eﬀects for the foreign country.17 The overall assessment of
the policy depends on the relative weight with which the ﬁscal authorities value the welfare
of current and future generations. Simulations suggest that the short-run impact is likely
to dominate, and therefore a debt-ﬁnanced tax cut is likely to be beggar-thy-neighbour.
However, reasonable parameter values in this model do not seem to produce spillover ef-
fects above 0.02% for an increase in debt of 1% (percentages of steady state output). This
ﬁnding that spillovers are small would concur with simulations carried out with several gen-
eral equilibrium macroeconomic models (see Gros and Hobza, 2001). But it is important
to notice that the model is a non-stochastic model with many simplifying assumptions that
could be relaxed. The sign rather than the size of the eﬀects should be taken as the main
point of the exercise, which shows that including non-Ricardian elements in the analysis
can substantially alter the predictions of the Redux.
As pointed out by Ganelli (2003b), this model can partially explain the eﬀects of the tax
cut announced in 2001 by the US administration. According to the model, this announce-
ment will have contributed to strengthen the dollar in that year. The model also predicts
that, in the long run, the announcement should result in a depreciation of the US currency
driven by a deterioration in net foreign assets. This is what happened following the tax
cuts of the Reagan administration. This time however, the long run seems to have come
17Notice that in the long run the relative responses are enough to assess the overall impact on each variable,
since long-run world consumption and output do not change when government spending is kept constant
(for details see Appendix A.3).
21rather quickly, since the dollar started to fall against other major currencies immediately
since the second quarter of 2002. However, this can be justiﬁe db yt h ef a c tt h a tt h eU Si s
now the world’s largest debtor and that, therefore, concerns about the sustainability of the
US current account have set in much faster than before.
The eﬀects of a debt-ﬁnanced increase in government expenditure, assuming no home
bias in public consumption, are outlined in Ganelli (2003b). This measure can be seen as
the sum of a debt-ﬁnanced tax cut and a balanced budget increase in government spending.
In this case, the eﬀects on the exchange rate are ambiguous. In the short run, the “debt”
eﬀect pushes for an appreciation, while the “balanced-budget” eﬀect pushes for depreciation.
Therefore, in this model, when countries are allowed to accumulate debt, ﬁscal expansions
can be welfare improving for the home country. However, if countries are bound by rules
limiting the size of the budget deﬁcits, the country is more likely to beneﬁtf r o mﬁscal
contractions instead (balanced-budget tax-cuts), in the same way as in the Redux model.
4 Fiscal Policy Coordination
It is important to note that the identiﬁcation of policy spillovers per se does not necessarily
imply gains from policy coordination. Even when large spillover eﬀects are identiﬁed, coor-
dination would only be useful if it can bring welfare signiﬁcantly above the level obtained
by nationally oriented policies. The initial contributions to the still-emerging second gener-
ation of policy coordination models, namely Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002) and Corsetti and
Pesenti (2001), which focus on monetary policy, could not produce substantial coordination
gains. Canzoneri et al. (2002a) point out the fact that this is due to some simplifying
assumptions which ensure analytical tractability but considerably reduce interdependence,
making these models at the end as unlikely to produce large gains from coordination as the
ﬁrst-generation old-Keynesian models were. The simplifying assumption of a Cobb-Douglas
aggregation for the consumption bundle, for instance, implies that expected employment is
either insulated from shocks or is proportional to expected consumption. Therefore, there
is no trade-oﬀ between the stabilisation of consumption and the stabilisation of employ-
22ment, which are the two objectives built into the social welfare function.18 In addition the
assumption that shocks are symmetric across sectors excludes the possibility of additional
trade-oﬀs in the stabilisation of consumption that could stem from asymmetric sectoral
shocks. Canzoneri et al. (2002a) show that even maintaining the restrictive assumptions
that render the models tractable it is possible to obtain large gains with asymmetric sectoral
shocks.
When no, or only insigniﬁcant, trade-oﬀs are implied by the Nash solution, central
banks can mimic or close to mimic the ﬂexible price equilibrium, and since in that case
the ﬂexible price solution is equal or is close to the (constrained) optimum, the Nash and
the Cooperative solutions coincide or are close to each other. This was one of the main
reasons why the old models could only generate gains from achieving eﬃciency through
cooperation that were of a second order when compared to the gains of responding to the
shocks themselves (see Canzoneri and Minford, 1988). Apart from the price inertia, there
were no other plausible distortions that could drive the cooperative and Nash solutions
suﬃciently apart.
In the NOEM literature, monopolistic competition is an additional source of ineﬃciency,
but Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002) show that it must still be coupled with other distortions
such as ﬁnancial market frictions or distortionary taxes to generate ﬁrst-order gains from
cooperation. Otherwise, the cooperative solution will always target the ﬂexible price equi-
librium, which will also be a Nash solution. In their model, which is a stochastic version
of the Redux where the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ρ is allowed to be diﬀerent
from 1, this occurs precisely when ρ =1(the case of the Redux) or when all shocks are sym-
metric. Whenever these conditions are not met, the sharing of tradable consumption risks
is not eﬃcient and there is another distortion in addition to the one caused by monopoly.
Hence the optimal cooperative policy will strike a balance between improving the risk shar-
ing and mitigating the price rigidities. However, making ρ diﬀer from one in their model is
18Direct utility from money balances tends to be ignored to avoid dealing with the accompanying incentives
for central banks to generate surprise inﬂation or deﬂation. Direct utility from government spending would
create the additional objective of stabilisation of government expenditure.
23not suﬃcient to generate large gains. But following this direction, Sutherland (2002) shows
that adopting a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregation for the consumption
bundle together with the assumption of ﬁnancial market imperfections can generate such
potentially large gains.19 However, this and other similar promising extensions to the Redux
result in a welfare function that depends on the ﬁr s ta sw e l la so nt h es e c o n dm o m e n t so f
the variables. Since the ﬁrst moments of the relevant variables depend also on the second
moments, it becomes necessary to calculate the solution of a second-order approximation
of the model to obtain an accurate measure of welfare (see Kim and Kim, 2002). This type
of solution is more diﬃcult to obtain and the necessary computational methods have only
recently been applied to these problems.20
So far, the main focus of attention in this “second-generation” literature has been mon-
etary policy coordination, probably because, as mentioned in the introduction, there are
doubts about whether ﬁscal policy can be useful as a stabilisation tool, but also because
very little is still known about the stylised facts of the transmission of ﬁscal policy which
would enable one to choose between alternative speciﬁcations. Nevertheless, a few studies
have begun to revisit the issue. Beetsa and Jensen (2002) include ﬁscal policy in a model
similar to that of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002) to analyse the gains from stabilisation using
balanced-budget changes in government spending in a monetary union where the ﬁscal au-
thorities commit to cooperate and therefore maximise the aggregate welfare of the union.
By focusing only on the cooperative solution they avoid the problem of calculating ﬁrst
moments because in the cooperative solution these terms drop from the welfare function
and a ﬁrst-order solution to the model is enough to measure the changes in the joint utility.
In their model consumers derive direct utility from ﬁscal expansions and there is complete
19Benigno (2001) had already shown that these two features increased welfare in the cooperative solution
but, using a ﬁrst order approximation to solve the model, could not estimate accurate Nash solutions in
order to assess the net gains from coordination. Sutherland (2002) is able to estimate these gains with a
second-order solution method.
20Alternative methods are proposed in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001) and in Sutherland (2002). Christo-
pher Sims also proposes a diﬀerent method for which the computational routines are available with notes at
http://eco-072399b.princeton.edu/yftp/gensys2/
24home bias in government purchases. They show that the optimal ﬁscal policy will close
the terms-of-trade gap between the two regions in the union. They also show that there
are beneﬁts of commitment over discretion, because under discretion ﬁscal policy is less
active and less persistent towards stabilising shocks than under commitment resulting in
a lower level of welfare. Finally the model is also used to calculate the gains from using
public spending for macroeconomic stabilisation. In their benchmark calculation the gains
amount to a permanent consumption gain of about 0.6% of steady-state output. However,
to estimate the net gains from coordination it is necessary to obtain estimates of the levels
of welfare when each individual country plays Nash. This requires a second-order accurate
solution of the model.
Kim and Kim (2003) estimate gains from international tax policy cooperation using a
second-order accurate solution method but in a rather diﬀerent model. They use a cashless
model where consumers derive utility from consumption and leisure in a non-separable
way. They also introduce capital in the model and consider costs to capital accumulation.
Their results show that in this model the optimal tax policies respond pro-cyclically to
productivity shocks (positive productivity shocks prompt a reduction in taxes). They ﬁnd
gains from ﬁscal policy stabilisation of about 0.007% and 0.001% of output, depending
on the type of policy analysed, and additional welfare gains from tax policy coordination
relative to the Nash outcome of approximately 33%. In their calibrations the coeﬃcient of
risk aversion is equal to 2. Table 3 summarises their results.
Table 3: Gains from stabilisation and coordination using alternative tax policies under
ﬂexible exchange rates (percent of output).
Capital Income Tax Policy Labour Income Tax Policy 
(i) Stabilization gain 0.0065 0.0015
(ii) Coordination gain 0.0022 0.0005
(iii) Ratio 100x(ii)/(i) 33.8462 33.3333
Source: Kim and Kim (2003)
25As the research progresses in this area, many fundamental questions emerge about how
to model ﬁscal policy and how to think about the interactions between ﬁscal and monetary
policy. There are many doubts about how to think of ﬁscal policy in this literature. Can-
zoneri et al. (2002b) argue that discretionary changes in ﬁscal policy cannot be usefully
modelled from the perspective of stabilisation policy, because of its implementation delays
and its dependence on the political mood of the electorate. For this reason, they propose
looking at ﬁscal shocks as additional disturbances to which the monetary authorities have
to respond. An alternative way of thinking could be to focus on the best design of auto-
matic stabilisers. So far the preferences have been towards modelling ﬁscal policy using
simple rules. Beetsa and Jensen (2002) choose rules in which ﬁscal expenditure responds
automatically to changes in the consumption and terms-of-trade gaps, while in Kim and
Kim (2003) taxes respond in a pre-determined way to productivity shocks, much in the
same way as monetary policy rules have been modelled in many studies. Could these rules
be interpreted as an optimal design for ﬁscal stabilisers?
Another important issue is whether the models that are currently being used are ade-
quate. This is a diﬃcult question to answer since very little is still known about the stylised
facts of ﬁscal policy transmission. Only recently vector auto-regressive (VAR) analysis has
been used to study ﬁscal policy transmission channels empirically (see for instance Blan-
chard and Perotti, 2002). The results found so far in this analysis tend to predict a positive
response of consumption to an increase in government spending which is easier to reconcile
with the old MFD framework than with the Redux and many of its extensions. Canzoneri
et al. (2002b) point out that models that consider deviations from Ricardian equivalence
(e.g. ﬁnitely lived agents, borrowing constraints or other ﬁnancial market imperfections)
may be able to match better the stylised facts found with VAR analysis (these empirical
estimates however are still very imprecise and should be taken with reservations). In the
overlapping generations model described in section 3.5, a debt-ﬁnanced ﬁscal expansion
was in fact able to generate a wealth eﬀect that led to an increase in consumption. Hence,
from an empirical perspective it seems more plausible to proceed with the analysis of policy
coordination using models of this type. Also from a practical view point, most ﬁscal policy
26actions are debt-ﬁnanced rather than balanced-budget; hence it seems natural to use models
which allow us to analyse debt-ﬁnanced policies.
But another important point, the interaction between monetary and ﬁscal polices, has so
far been essentially overlooked, mainly for the sake of simplicity. This however is also likely
to be an important issue, since monetary policy determines how consumption ultimately
responds in the short run. In the ﬁxed exchange rate version of the Redux presented in
section 3.2, the world money supply was kept constant, for instance. This determined
that short-run aggregate consumption did not change. Also due to the eﬀects of money
growth on consumption, Caselli (2001) shows that the impact of ﬁscal consolidation depends
on whether a ﬁxed exchange rate regime is symmetric (e.g. European Monetary Union)
or asymmetric (e.g. ERM). The choice of monetary regime and the way monetary and
ﬁscal authorities interact is therefore likely to be crucial for welfare comparisons and hence
deserves thorough consideration.
5 Conclusions
The main goals of this article were to review the analysis of ﬁscal policy within recent
new open economy macroeconomic (NOEM) models, and to try to address a number of
outstanding questions, while also pointing to some challenges for future research. The
analysis focused on two points: ﬁrstly, on the identiﬁcation of potential spillover eﬀects
to third countries resulting from an active ﬁscal policy in one country in a non-stochastic
context; secondly, on the assessment of the potential gains from pursuing non-cooperative
and cooperative ﬁscal stabilisation policies.
There has been relatively little research on ﬁscal policy in the NOEM literature, but
nevertheless some important results can be highlighted concerning the impact of unantic-
ipated changes in ﬁscal policy at home and abroad. In the basic model, the Redux, a
domestic balanced-budget ﬁscal expansion prompts a deprec i a t i o no ft h eh o m ec u r r e n c y ’ s
nominal exchange rate and a deterioration of the home country’s terms of trade (deﬁned
27as the ratio of the price of home goods to the price of foreign goods), which is at odds
with the predictions of the traditional Mundell-Fleming-Dornbush (MFD) model where a
ﬁscal expansion by one country leads to a appreciation of its currency. Moreover, in the
Redux model, the negative impact of the deterioration in home’s terms of trade both in
the short run, when prices are ﬁxed, and in the long run, dominates the expenditure-
switching eﬀect triggered by the fall in the relative price of the goods produced at home.
Hence, in terms of its impact on welfare, the domestic ﬁscal expansion is beggar-thyself and
prosper-thy-neighbour. Households in the home country are worse oﬀ because they work
more and consume less (their income is lower due both to the increase in taxes needed to
ﬁnance the ﬁscal expansion and to a decline in sale’s revenues), while foreign households
work relatively less and consume more. In order to understand whether the exchange rate
regime is important to determine the results, we re-estimate the eﬀects of a domestic ﬁscal
expansion in a ﬁxed exchange rate version of the model. It turns out that the estimated
impact on the intertemporal welfare of consumers is the same under ﬂexible or ﬁxed rates
(keeping the world money stock constant under both regimes). Under ﬁxed exchange rates,
the costs/beneﬁts of ﬁscal policy are simply postponed from the short to the long run. In
the case of the home country, for instance, the short-run costs of the ﬁscal expansion are
smaller because there is no adjustment in the terms of trade (since prices are sticky and the
nominal exchange rate is not allowed to change). This however is counterbalanced by higher
long-run costs, since in the long run the terms of trade decline by more than in the ﬂexible
exchange rate model, because the deterioration of the net foreign asset position is stronger
under ﬁxed exchange rates (as the decline in relative wealth due to the increase in taxation
is not compensated by a short-run expenditure switching-eﬀect towards home goods, which
under ﬂexible exchange rates is brought about by an exchange rate depreciation).
There are two main assumptions that seem to drive the eﬀects a ﬁscal expansion in the
Redux: (i) the assumption of no home bias in ﬁscal spending; and (ii) the assumption that
the degree of within-country substitutability (substitutability between the varieties of the
good produced within the country), which must be bigger than one, is the same as the
degree of cross-country substitutability (substitutability between the goods produced by
28the diﬀerent countries). If (i) does not hold, and there is instead home bias in government
spending, it is no longer true that home households must split the direct beneﬁts of an
increase in demand with foreign households, while baring all the costs trough higher taxes.
Hence, in net-present-value terms there is an improvement in the terms of trade of the home
country, as opposed to the decline observed in the Redux. Assuming complete home bias
in government spending can alter the beggar-thyself and prosper-thy-neighbour eﬀects of a
domestic ﬁscal expansion depending on the relationship between the within and the cross-
country substitutability. If the cross-country substitutability is suﬃciently low the ﬁscal
expansion will be prosper-thyself and beggar-thy-neighbour, because the improvement in
the terms of trade of the home country will not be oﬀset by a large shift in demand towards
foreign goods. In this case foreign consumers will be worse oﬀ because the expenditure-
switching eﬀect will not be strong enough to compensate for the deterioration in the foreign
country’s terms of trade.
An alternative setup where a domestic ﬁscal expansion can prosper-thyself and beggar-
thy-neighbour is one where the Ricardian equivalence no longer holds and ﬁscal expansions
are debt-ﬁnanced. Using the overlapping generations model described in Ganelli (2003b) we
show that, in most cases, a tax cut ﬁnanced by debt at home will improve welfare at home
and reduce it abroad. This occurs because, once more, the eﬀect which is most likely to
dominate is an increase in consumption at home and a decline abroad caused by a change in
the terms of trade in favour of the home country. In the absence of Ricardian equivalence, a
debt-ﬁnanced ﬁscal expansion generates a wealth eﬀect in the home country which prompts
a short-run appreciation of the home currency, more in line with the predictions of the old
MFD framework.
It is important to note that the identiﬁcation of policy spillovers per se does not neces-
sarily imply gains from policy coordination, because in some situations the authorities can
reach a similar, or even identical, outcome acting independently or jointly. Research on
monetary policy has shown that it is theoretically possible to generate large gains from co-
ordination, but that has been achieved at the expense of analytical tractability. Regarding
29ﬁscal policy, Kim and Kim (2003) give already an example where the gains can be poten-
tially large, but more research needs to be pursued to test the robustness of the results to
other types of policy and model speciﬁcations. In particular, the estimation of coordination
gains has so far been carried out using models where the Ricardian equivalence holds and
where only balanced-budget policies can be analysed. Canzoneri et al. (2002b) point out
that future research should focus on deviations from Ricardian equivalence, which could
bring the ﬁscal policy transmission in the models more in line with stylised facts found
s of a ri nv e c t o ra u t o - r e g r e s s i v e( V A R )a nalysis. In particular, the empirical ﬁnding that
consumption increases in the short run in response to an increase in government spending is
at odds with the theoretical predictions of the Redux and many of the extensions that have
been used so far to quantify the gains from coordination. An overlapping generations model
of the type described in section 3.5 would be able to generate this response, but has not yet
been used to estimate coordination gains. These kind of models also have the advantage of
allowing us to analyse debt-ﬁnanced changes in ﬁscal policy, which are more often observed
empirically than balanced-budget ones.
Finally, it has been pointed out that more thought should be put into how to interpret
ﬁscal policy is these models. Should it be simply interpreted as an additional shock to which
monetary policy should respond or can it be interpreted as a useful stabilisation tool? Can
simple ﬁscal policy rules be used as a proxy for the design of optimal ﬁscal stabilisers?
Another important issue that was highlighted as deserving particular attention is the inter-
action between ﬁscal and monetary policy, which has in most cases been overlooked, but
seem to be important, at least from a theoretical perspective.
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33A Appendix
A . 1 F l e x i b l eE x c h a n g eR a t eR e d u x
The log-linear model is described by the system of equations presented in section 3. Note
that the market clearing ensures also that yw
t = cw
t + gw
t and
³
− n
1−n
´
b = b
∗
.F r o m t h e
Euler equation short-run money demand equations, it is also possible to write:
cw = cw −
δ
1+δ
r
mw = cw −
r
1+δ
−
pw
δ
where from the long-run money demand equation pw = mw − cw.H e n c e :
r =
1+δ
δ
µ
cw −
δmw + mw
1+δ
¶
cw = cw −
µ
cw −
δmw + mw
1+δ
¶
=
δmw + mw
1+δ
Monetary policy is crucial in determining the level of short-run aggregate demand but for
simplicity we will assume that m = m∗ = mw = m = m∗ = mw =0 .T h e r e f o r e :
r =
1+δ
δ
cw
cw =0
Note that this result depends on the assumption of log-preferences for real money balances,
if the elasticity is ε 6=1 , short-run aggregate consumption will still be linked to the long-run
aggregate consumption:
yw = cw
t + gw
t = gw
t
(c − c∗)=( c − c∗)=−e = −
δ (1 + σ)
σδ(1 + σ)+2 σ
·
(g − g∗)+
1
δ
(g − g∗)
¸
(y − y∗)=σe =
δ (1 + σ)
δ (1 + σ)+2
·
(g − g∗)+
1
δ
(g − g∗)
¸
34b =
(1 − n)δ (1 + σ)
δ (1 + σ)+2
·
(g − g∗)+
1
δ
(g − g∗)
¸
− (1 − n)(g − g∗)
tot ≡ p(h) − e − p∗ (f)− = −
δ
σ [δ (1 + σ)+2 ]
·
(g − g∗)+
1
δ
(g − g∗)
¸
(y − y∗)=−σtot =
δ
δ (1 + σ)+2
·
(g − g∗)+
1
δ
(g − g∗)
¸
where tot stands for home’s terms of trade. Using the Aoki decomposition c = cw +( 1−
n)(c − c∗) and y = yw +( 1− n)(y − y∗), it is possible to obtain:
c = −
(1 − n)δ (1 + σ)
σδ(1 + σ)+2 σ
·
(g − g∗)+
1
δ
(g − g∗)
¸
c = −
gw
2
−
(1 − n)δ (1 + σ)
σδ(1 + σ)+2 σ
·
(g − g∗)+
1
δ
(g − g∗)
¸
y = gw +
δ (1 + σ)(1− n)
δ (1 + σ)+2
·
(g − g∗)+
1
δ
(g − g∗)
¸
y =
gw
2
+
δ(1 − n)
δ (1 + σ)+2
·
(g − g∗)+
1
δ
(g − g∗)
¸
Hence, the eﬀects of temporary increases in government spending can be summarised as
follows:
∂c
∂g
= −
(1 − n)δ (1 + σ)
σδ(1 + σ)+2 σ
< 0
∂c
∂g∗ =
(1 − n)δ (1 + σ)
σδ(1 + σ)+2 σ
> 0
∂c
∂g
= −
(1 − n)δ (1 + σ)
σδ(1 + σ)+2 σ
< 0
∂c
∂g∗ =
(1 − n)δ (1 + σ)
σδ(1 + σ)+2 σ
> 0
∂y
∂g
= n +
δ (1 + σ)(1− n)
δ (1 + σ)+2
> 0
∂y
∂g∗ =1− n −
δ (1 + σ)(1− n)
δ (1 + σ)+2
> 0
∂y
∂g
=
δ(1 − n)
δ (1 + σ)+2
> 0
∂y
∂g∗ = −
δ(1 − n)
δ (1 + σ)+2
< 0
While the multipliers of a permanent increase in government spending, such that g = g;
g∗ = g∗,w i l lb e :
∂c
∂g
= −
(1 − n)(1+δ)(1+σ)
σδ(1 + σ)+2 σ
< 0
∂c
∂g∗ =
(1 − n)(1+δ)(1+σ)
σδ(1 + σ)+2 σ
> 0
∂c
∂g
= −
·
n
2
+
(1 − n)(1+δ)(1+σ)
σδ(1 + σ)+2 σ
¸
< 0
∂c
∂g∗ =
2+δ (1 + σ)(2− σ)
σδ(1 + σ)+2 σ
∂y
∂g
= n +
(1 − n)(1+δ)(1+σ)
δ (1 + σ)+2
> 0
∂y
∂g∗ =1− n −
(1 + δ)(1+σ)(1− n)
δ (1 + σ)+2
< 0
∂y
∂g
=
n
2
+
(1 + δ)(1− n)
δ (1 + σ)+2
> 0
∂y
∂g∗ =
(1 − n)δ (σ − 1)
δ (1 + σ)+2
> 0
35For marginal changes in government spending, it is possible to calculate their welfare impact
by substituting the results into the log-linear social utility function:21
dUR = c −
σ − 1
σ
y +
1
δ
µ
c −
σ − 1
σ
y
¶
to obtain:
dUR = −
σ − n
2σ
·
2g +
(2σ − n)
(σ − n)δ
g
¸
+
(1 − n)
2σ
·
2g∗ +
1
δ
g∗
¸
A.2 Fixed Exchange Rate Redux
In the ﬁxed exchange rate regime, the exchange rate is kept constant both in the short
and in the long run, such that e = e =0 . Except for this constraint, the log-linearised
equations of the model are the same given in section 3. From the money demand equations
this implies that:
m − m∗ = c − c∗
Since PPP holds, the other immediate implications of exchange rate stability are:
p = p∗ =0
p = p∗
Subtracting now the two SR-current account equations gives:
b =( 1− n)[(y − y∗) − (c − c∗) − (g − g∗)] (2)
Subtracting also the LR-current account equations, it is possible to write:
c − c∗ =
1
1 − n
δb + y − y∗ − [p∗(f) − p(h)] − (g − g∗) (3)
As in the ﬂexible exchange rate version of the model, the log-linearised system implies that:
b =( 1 − n)[(y − y∗) − (c − c∗) − (g − g∗)]
y − y∗ = σe
y − y∗ = σ[e + p∗(f) − p(h)]
y − y∗ = −
σ
1+σ
(c − c∗)
21Note that y0 =
³
σ−1
σk0
´ 1
2 .
36Notice that in this regime short-run relative output remains constant:
(y − y∗)fix = σe =0
Replacing these results in the diﬀerence of the LR−current accounts (3), taking into account
that e = e =0 , gives:
b =
2σ (1 − n)
δ (1 + σ)
(c − c∗)+
(1 − n)
δ
(g − g∗)
Substituting now b in the diﬀerence of the SR−current accounts (2), recalling that c−c∗ =
c − c∗ yields:
(c − c∗)fix =( c − c∗)fix = −
δ (1 + σ)
δ (1 + σ)+2 σ
·
g − g∗ +
1
δ
(g − g∗)
¸
Long-run relative output can be obtained by replacing (c − c∗) into the labour-leisure trade-
oﬀ equation:
(y − y∗)fix = −
σ
1+σ
(c − c∗)fix =
δσ
δ (1 + σ)+2 σ
·
g − g∗ +
1
δ
(g − g∗)
¸
The multipliers for a ﬁscal expansion in the ﬁxed exchange rate regime can be compared to
those obtained in the ﬂexible exchange rate version of the model:
−
∂ (c − c∗)
∂ (g − g∗)
¯ ¯
¯ ¯
fix
=
δ (1 + σ)
δ (1 + σ)+2 σ
> −
∂ (c − c∗)
∂ (g − g∗)
¯ ¯
¯ ¯
flex
∂ (y − y∗)
∂ (g − g∗)
¯
¯ ¯ ¯
fix
=0 <
∂ (y − y∗)
∂ (g − g∗)
¯
¯ ¯ ¯
flex
−
∂ (c − c∗)
∂ (g − g∗)
¯
¯ ¯ ¯
fix
=
δ (1 + σ)
δ (1 + σ)+2 σ
> −
∂ (c − c∗)
∂ (g − g∗)
¯
¯ ¯ ¯
flex
∂ (y − y∗)
∂ (g − g∗)
¯
¯ ¯ ¯
fix
=
δσ
δ (1 + σ)+2 σ
>
∂ (y − y∗)
∂ (g − g∗)
¯
¯ ¯ ¯
flex
Recall now that the ﬁxed exchange rate requirement implied that m−m∗ = c−c∗. Hence:
m − m∗ = −
δ (1 + σ)
δ (1 + σ)+2 σ
·
g − g∗ +
1
δ
(g − g∗)
¸
Aggregate consumption depends on the type of the monetary arrangement. Since the aim
is not to compare diﬀerent types of ﬁxed exchange rate regimes, we maintain the same
37assumption regarding the world money stock as under ﬂexible exchange rates, that is mw =
mw =0 . Therefore:
r =
1+δ
δ
cw
cw =0
yw = cw + gw = gw
and
m = mw +( 1− n)(m − m∗)=−
(1 − n)δ (1 + σ)
δ (1 + σ)+2 σ
·
g − g∗ +
1
δ
(g − g∗)
¸
m∗ = mw − n(m − m∗)=
nδ (1 + σ)
δ (1 + σ)+2 σ
·
g − g∗ +
1
δ
(g − g∗)
¸
Once more we estimate the impact of marginal changes in government spending on welfare
by substituting the results into the log-linear social utility function to obtain:
dUR
fix = −
σ − 1
σ
gw −
(2σ − 1)
2σδ
gw − (1 − n)
·
(g − g∗)+
1
δ
(g − g∗)
¸
= dUR
A.3 Eﬀects of a Debt-Financed Tax-Cut in an Overlapping Generations
Model
Ganelli (2003b) gives the analytical results for the impact of a debt-ﬁnanced tax cut on
the exchange rate and relative output and consumption. The results for the impact on
world aggregates can be inferred from the closed-economy model in Ganelli (2002), but the
analytical results for the log-linearised model are calculated here. These enable us to ﬁnd
expressions for the overall eﬀect on each country’s consumption and output and allow us
to run simulations to assess the overall impact of this policy on welfare. The log-linearised
38equilibrium equations of the model (derived in Ganelli, 2003b) can be summarised as follows:
yt = σ [pt − pt (h)] + cw
t + gw
t market clearing
pt = npt (h)+( 1− n)[et + p∗
t (h)] prices
mt − pt = ct −
rt
R0
−
pt − pt
R0 − 1
money demand
(σ − 1)yt = −ψσ(ct + pt − pt (h)) labour-leisure trade-off
c =
1 − qβ
1+χ + ψ
(1 − q)(1 + ψ)
R0
R0 − q
h + qβR0c + qβ(R0 − 1)rE u l e r e q u a t i o n
h = −(pt − pt (h)) +
1
θ(1 + ψ)
y −
q (R0 − 1)
(R0 − q)R0
r −
R0 − 1
1+ψ
d LR financial wealth
b = −(pt − pt (h)) + y − c − g SR current account
c =( R0 − 1)b − (p − p(h)) + y − g LR current account
where all variables are in deviations from the initial steady state; R0 is the steady state level
of the gross real interest rate, which is diﬀerent from δ; d is debt accumulation; ψ is the
weight of leisure in the utility function (the disutility of leisure is logarithmic in this model);
h is ﬁnancial wealth accumulation; and (1 − q) is the probability of death; all remaining
parameters are deﬁned as before. Parallel conditions hold for the foreign economy. It can
be shown (see Ganelli, 2003b) that the steady state level of the gross real interest rate must
satisfy:
R2
0 −
·
q +
1
qβ
µ
1 −
1 − qβ
1+χ + ψ
(1 − q)(1 + ψ)
¶¸
R0 +
1
β
=0
with the stable solution corresponding to the highest root (see Ganelli, 2002, for details).
The policy being analysed is a tax-cut ﬁnanced by debt accumulation, with long-run taxes
increasing endogenously to meet interest payments. Hence:
(R0 − 1)d = −(R0 − 1)τ = τ
where τ are non-distortionary taxes. Aggregating the home and foreign labour-leisure trade-
oﬀ equations, it is possible to obtain:
yw = −ψ
σ
σ − 1
cw
39Aggregating the output demand equations:
yw = cw + gw
Hence
cw = −
σ − 1
σ − 1+ψσ
gw
yw =
ψσ
σ − 1+ψσ
gw
Assuming that gw =0(since the policy being analysed here is a debt-ﬁnanced tax cut):
cw = yw =0
Substituting this result in the aggregation of the long-run Euler equation, it is possible to
obtain the accumulation of wealth as a function of the long-run world real interest rate:
h
w
= −
qβ(R0 − 1)
a1
r (4)
where a1 =
1 − qβ
1+χ + ψ
(1 − q)(1 + ψ)
R0
R0 − q
. In the aggregated short-run Euler equation,
these results yield:
cw = −
Ã
a1h
w
+ qβ(R0 − 1)r
qβR0
!
=
R0 − 1
R0
(r − r) (5)
Taking now the aggregated short-run money demand equation:
mw = cw −
r
R0
−
pw
R0 − 1
(6)
To eliminate pw
t , notice that in the long run:
mw − pw = cw −
r
R0
Assuming that mw
t = mw
t =0 , since the focus now is on ﬁscal policy:
pw =
r
R0
Substituting in equation (6):
cw =
r
R0
+
r
R0 (R0 − 1)
(7)
40w h i c hc o m b i n e dw i t he q u a t i o n( 5 )g i v e sar e l a tionship between the short- and the long-run
real interest rate (in terms of deviations from the steady state):
r =
(R0 − 1)
2 − 1
R0 (R0 − 1)
r
Substituting this result in (7) gives the short-run world consumption as a function of the
long-run real interest rate:
cw =
1
R0
r
The next step is to ﬁnd an expression for the long-run real interest rate as a function of
the policy variables. This can be done by looking at the aggregated equation for wealth
accumulation, taking into account that yw =0and using result (4):
h
w
= −
q (R0 − 1)
(R0 − q)R0
r −
R0 − 1
1+ψ
d
⇐⇒ −
qβ(R0 − 1)
a1
r = −
q (R0 − 1)
(R0 − q)R0
r −
R0 − 1
1+ψ
d
⇐⇒ q (R0 − 1)
·
a1 − β (R0 − q)R0
a1 (R0 − q)R0
¸
r = −
R0 − 1
1+ψ
d
⇐⇒ r =
a1 (R0 − q)R0
β (R0 − q)R0 − a1
R0 − 1
q (R0 − 1)(1 + ψ)
d
⇐⇒ r = a5
R0 − 1
q (R0 − 1)(1 + ψ)
d
where a5 =
a1(R0−q)R0
β(R0−q)R0−a1. Since from the steady-state equilibrium condition for R0,i tc a n
be shown that R0 = 1−a1
qβ , it is simple to show that a5 is always positive:
β (R0 − q)R0 − a1 > 0 ⇒ R2
0 >
1
β
This is always satisﬁed since in the stable steady-state solution R0 > 1
β and β<1.H e n c e
(taking into account the market clearing equations and the assumption that gw =0 ):
cw = yw =
a5
qR0 (1 + ψ)
d
41The baseline parameters used for the simulations are:
q =0 .7;
β =0 .95;
χ =1 ;
ψ =1 ;
σ =7 .5;
n =0 .5;
d =1 ;
d
∗
=0 ;
g = g∗ =0 ;
T h ec h o i c eo fβ corresponds to a long-run real interest rate of 5%. The degree of monopolistic
competition σ was chosen to be approximately equal to that set by Rotemberg and Woodford
(1998).22 Changing χ and ψ does not change the results signiﬁc a n t l y( e v e ni ft h e yt a k e
values lower than one). Social welfare was assumed to take the form:
W = U +
qβ
1 − qβ
U
This corresponds to evaluating the welfare of a representative agent of generation a using
per capita values for consumption and employment.
22They chose σ =7 .66,w h i c hi m p l i e sa na v e r a g em a r k - u po f15%.
42Figure 1: Eﬀects of a debt-ﬁnanced tax cut as the probability of staying alive, q,i n c r e a s e s .
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43Figure 2: Eﬀects of a debt-ﬁnanced tax cut as competition increases (as the elasticity of
substitution between varieties, σ, increases).
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44Figure 3: Eﬀects of a debt-ﬁnanced tax cut as the size of the home country, n,i n c r e a s e s .
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
c
,
 
c
*
,
 
s
h
o
r
t
 
r
u
n
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
y
,
 
y
*
,
 
s
h
o
r
t
 
r
u
n
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
d
U
,
 
d
U
*
,
 
s
h
o
r
t
 
r
u
n
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
d
U
,
 
d
U
*
,
 
l
o
n
g
 
r
u
n
n
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
,
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
n
- home    
x foreign 
45TITLES IN THE ENEPRI WORKING PAPER SERIES 
No. 21 Fiscal Policy in the New Open Economy Macroeconomics and Prospects for Fiscal Policy 
Coordination, Leonor Coutinho, June 2003 
No. 20 European Wage Coordination: Nightmare or dream to come true?, Alain Borghijs, Sjef 
Ederveen and Ruud de Mooij, May 2003 
No. 19 Youth Employment in the OECD: Demographic Shifts, Labour Market Institutions and 
Macroeconomic Shocks, Juan F. Jimeno and Diego Rodríguez-Palenzuela, March 2003 
No. 18 Convergence in Social Protection across EU Countries, 1970-1999, Simón Sosvilla-Rivero, 
José A. Herce and Juan-José de Lucio, March 2003 
No. 17 The Impact of the Euro on EMU Trade: The (Early) Effect Is Not so Large, Sergio de Nardis 
and Claudio Vicarelli, February 2003 
No.16 Mutual Recognition in Goods and Services: An Economic Perspective, Jacques Pelkmans, March 
2003 
No. 15 Estimating the Effects of Fiscal Policy in OECD Countries, Roberto Perotti, October 2002 
No. 14 How to Finance Eastern Enlargement of the EU: The Need to Reform EU Policies and the 
Consequences for the Net Contributor Balance, Christian Weise, October 2002 
No. 13 Mutual Recognition, Unemployment and the Welfare State, Fiorella Kostoris Padoa Schioppa, 
September 2002 
No. 12 Internal Migration in Regions of Germany: A Panel Data Analysis, Ashok Parikh and Michiel 
Van Leuvensteijn, September 2002 
No. 11 Interdependent Growth in the EU: The Role of Trade, María Garcia-Vega and José A. Herce, 
September 2002 
No. 10 Equilibrium Rates and Wage Flexibility in Europe, R.C.M.H. Douven, August 2002 
No. 9 Midlife Caregiving and Employment: An Analysis of Adjustments in Work Hours and Informal 
Care for Female Employees in Europe, C. Katharina Spiess and Ulrike Schneider, February 
2002 
No. 8 Turkey’s Performance in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment: Implications of Enlargement, 
Henry Loewendahl and Ebru Ertugal-Loewendahl, November 2001 
No. 7 Is the ECB sufficiently accountable and transparent? Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi and Daniel Gros, 
September 2001 
No. 6 Maastricht and the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime in Transition Countries during the Run-
Up to EMU, György Szapáry, September 2001 
No. 5 What drove relative wages in France? Structural Decomposition Analysis in a General 
Equilibrium Framework, 1970-1992, Sébastien Jean and Olivier Bontout, September 2001 
No. 4 Foreign Direct Investment and Corporate Income Taxation in Europe, Agnès Bénassy-Quéré, 
Lionel Fontagné, and Amina Lahrèche-Révil, April 2001 
No. 3 European Labour Markets and the Euro: How much flexibility do we really need?, Michael 
Burda, March 2001 
No. 2 Asymmetric Labour Markets in a Converging Europe: Do differences matter? Ray Barrell and 
Karen Dury, January 2001 
No. 1 Fiscal federalism in Western European and selected other countries: Centralisation or 
decentralisation? What is better for economic growth?, Ulrich Thiessen, January 2001 ABOUT ENEPRI 
The European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes (ENEPRI) is composed of leading 
socio-economic research institutes in practically all EU member states and candidate countries that are 
committed to working together to develop and consolidate a European agenda of research. ENEPRI 
was launched in 2000 by the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), which 
provides overall coordination for the initiative.  
While the European construction has made gigantic steps forward in the recent past, the European 
dimension of research seems to have been overlooked. The provision of economic analysis at the 
European level, however, is a fundamental prerequisite to the successful understanding of the 
achievements and challenges that lie ahead. ENEPRI aims to fill this gap by pooling the research 
efforts of its different member institutes in their respective areas of specialisation and to encourage an 
explicit European-wide approach. 
ENEPRI is composed of the following member institutes: 
CASE  Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, Poland 
CEBR  Centre for Economic and Business Research, Copenhagen, Denmark 
CEPII  Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales, Paris, France 
CEPS  Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, Belgium 
CERGE-EI  Centre for Economic Research and Graduate Education, Charles University, Prague, 
Czech Republic 
CPB  Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, The Hague, The Netherlands 
DIW  Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin, Germany 
ESRI  Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
ETLA  Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, Helsinki, Finland 
FEDEA  Fundacion de Estudios de Economia Aplicada, Madrid, Spain 
FPB  Belgian Federal Planning Bureau, Brussels, Belgium 
IE-BAS  Institute of Economics, Bulgarian Acadamy of Sciences, Sofia, Bulgaria 
IE-LAS  Institute of Economics, Latvian Academy of Sciences, Riga, Latvia 
IER  Institute for Economic Research, Ljubljana, Slovenia 
IHS  Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria 
ISAE  Istituto di Studi e Analisi Economica, Rome, Italy 
ISCTE  Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa, Lisbon, Portugal 
ISWE-SAS  Institute for Slovak and World Economy, Bratislava, Slovakia 
NEI New  Economy  Institute, Vilnius, Lithuania 
NIER  National Institute of Economic Research, Stockholm, Sweden 
NIESR  National Institute for Economic and Social Research, London, UK 
NOBE  Niezalezny Osrodek Bana Ekonomicznych, Lodz, Poland 
PRAXIS  Center for Policy Studies, Tallinn, Estonia 
RCEP  Romanian Centre for Economic Policies, Bucharest, Romania 
TÁRKI  Social Research Centre, Budapest, Hungary 
This ENEPRI Working Paper series aims at making the research undertaken by the member 
institutes or in the context of special ENEPRI events known to a wide public. Unless 
otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal 
capacity and not to any institution with which he or she is associated. 
ENEPRI publications are partially funded by the European Commission under its Fifth 
Framework Programme - contract no. HPSE-CT-1999-00004. 
European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes 
c/o Centre for European Policy Studies 
Place du Congrès 1 ▪ 1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: 32(0) 229.39.11 ▪ Fax: 32(0) 219.41.51 
Website: http//:www.enepri.org ▪ E-mail: info@enepri.org 